Re-Regulation of the Financial Services Industry in the United Kingdom by Peeters, Jan
RE-REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES
INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM*
JAN PEETERS**
1. INTRODUCTION
When discussing market structures and regulation of the financial
services industry, distinctions are traditionally made between long-term
saving, deposit banking and capital markets. These financial services
were separated in distinct compartments in both the United States and
the United Kingdom. Barriers, often fixed by legislation, constrained
what the various financial intermediaires could and could not do, while
within each compartment limitations were imposed upon competition in
an effort to maintain the stability of the financial system as a whole. In
both countries, this compartmentalization of market participants was
reflected in the regulatory structure. The regulatory controls applicable
to a certain type of market activity (which due to the compartmental-
ization was limited to a single type of firm) were enforced by a regula-
tor or various regulators responsible for each type of activity. Special-
ized financial institutions thus did not only have their own domain but
also their own regulator.'
* This article is based on a paper presented by the author to the Financial
Services Seminar 1986-1987 at Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California,
Berkeley, in May 1987. Major events have occurred since then. They have been taken
into account in so far as they influenced the regulatory structure of the financial
services industry in the United Kingdom.
** Attorney at Law, Brussels, Belgium; LL.M. Fellow, Belgian American Edu-
cational Foundation, 1986-87; LL.M., Boalt Hall School of Law, University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley, 1987; Licentiaat in de Rechten, Universitaire Instelling Antwerpen,
1986.
1. The Glass-Steagall Act separated commercial banking or loans from invest-
ment banking or underwriting securities. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, §§
16, 20, 21, 32, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 restricted affiliation of banks with non-bank-
ing enterprises. 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
The Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967 restricted the affilia-
tion of thrifts with non-thrift institutions. Pub. L. No. 90-255, 82 Stat. 5 (1968)(codi-
fied at 12 U.S.C. § 1730a). Various state laws restricted affiliations between banks and
other enterprises or their agents (especially insurance agents). See Huertas, Redesign-
ing Regulation: The Future of Finance in the United States, in RESTRUcTURING THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM: A SYMPOSIUM SPONSORED By THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
KANSAS CrrY 140 (1987). In the United Kingdom, the historical separation of the
various financial services in distinct compartments and the creation of self-regulating
clubs or associations in each compartment was encouraged by the Bank of England
largely on a non-statutory basis. D'Hav6 & Quintyn, Regulering en deregulering van
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These lines of demarcation have started to blur gradually, in part
due to fundamental economic and technological changes. The blurring
of the distinctions between banks and savings and loan institutions in
the United States is very similar to developments in the United King-
dom, where clearing banks and building societies have entered into
competition with one another. Both countries have also seen increasing
efforts by deposit banking participants attempting to enter capital mar-
kets and vice versa.2 In an attempt to accommodate these market forces,
legal and regulatory loopholes have been increasingly exploited in the
United States, but such exploitation has not necessarily been consistent
with the goal of preserving financial stability or, arguably, with the
best approach for the future.'
Notwithstanding these fundamental changes in market structure,
the U.S. regulatory framework has remained essentially unchanged. At
first, little attention seems to have been paid to the possible effects of
these changes on the regulatory landscape. Congressional consensus on
a regulatory response was lacking. In addition, there was no agreement
among the industries involved and only partial agreement among the
regulators. A consensus seemed to be growing, however, towards adopt-
ing a structure based on "functional" rather than on "institutional"
regulation, and thus at regulating each common activity or product
through a single agency, under a common set of rules, irrespective of
the type of institution involved. A recent case dealing with Rule 3b-9
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 showed that functhonal reg-
ulation would not be viable unless Congress acted explicitly,4 but such
action seemed unlikely in light of the lack of a Congressional consensus.
A "functionally" oriented bill, sponsored by the Reagan Adminis-
tration, was nevertheless introduced in both houses of Congress, but
definancile sector in het Verenigd Koninkrijk, 1987 REVUE DE LA BANQUE, No. 4,
at 97; The Economics of 'Big Bang,' MIDLAND BANK REV., Summer 1987, at 6; Dep-
uty Governor of the Bank of England, The Business of Financial Supervision, 24
BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 46 (1984); Governor of the Bank of England, Shifting Frontiers
in Financial Markets: Their Causes and Consequences, 25 BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 207
(1985).
2. See Friedman & Friesen, A New Paradigm for Financial Regulation: Get-
ting From Here to There, 43 MD. L. REV. 413, 428-42 (1984). For the United King-
dom, see George, The City Revolution, 25 BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 422 (1985).
3. Parry, Major Trends in the U.S. Financial System: Implications and Issues,
FED. RESERVE BANK S.F. ECON. REV., Spring 1987, at 5; Huertas, supra note 1, at
145-47; Governor of the Bank of England, supra note 1, at 207.
4. American Bankers Association v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Under
Rule 3b-9, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") would require banks
performing certain securities activities to register with the SEC as broker-dealer.
Applicability of Broker-Dealer Registration to Banks, Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Release No. 34-20357, 48 Fed. Reg. 51,930 (Nov. 15, 1983) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 240.3b-9).
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was overshadowed at the time by more pressing issues such as the in-
tegrity of the savings and loan insurance system.5 Meanwhile regula-
tors continued to meet the demands of the market by broadly interpret-
ing the existing statutory provisions, thereby furthering the
diversification of financial intermediaries. In response, the Reagan Ad-
ministration recently had to accept the closing of the "non-bank" bank
loophole and a moratorium on certain "non-banking" activities that
had been approved by bank regulators in exchange for Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC") recapitalization.6
When arguing in favor of a repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, and
full de-regulation of the U.S. financial markets, U.S. firms usually re-
fer to the developments occurring in the British financial markets fol-
lowing the highly publicized "Big Bang." Following the market re-
structuring that had taken place due to the abolition of fixed
commissions on the London Stock Exchange, a neat distinction of func-
tions carried out by separate financial institutions was no longer possi-
ble.7 However, the market restructuring was parallelled by fundamen-
tal changes in the British regulatory structure. Financial scandals have
forced the Bank of England ("the Bank") and the Department of
Trade and Industry ("DTI") to reconsider the existing regulatory
framework in the United Kingdom and have resulted in the enactment
of the Building Societies Act 1986, the Financial Services Act 1986 and
the Banking Act 1987.
Some valuable insight can be drawn from the "re-regulatory" pro-
cess that has occurred over the past five years in the United Kingdom.
This article begins by discussing the regulatory structure that existed in
the United Kingdom before "Big Bang." It then describes the current
U.K. regulatory framework (statutory backed self-regulation), which is
characterized by the presence of functional regulators that have to coop-
5. See Peters & Powers, Functional Regulation - Looking Ahead, 18 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 1075 (1985); Friedman & Friesen, supra note 2, at 454; Functional Regula-
tion, Other Provisions in Administration's Competitiveness Bill, 48 BANKING REP.
(BNA) 343 (Feb. 28, 1987).
6. Zweig, Fed Ready to Hear Arguments for New Bank Powers, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 2, 1987, at 6, col. 1; Order Approving Applications to Engage in Limited Under-
writing and Dealing in Certain Securities, 73 FED. RESERVE BULL. 473 (1987); Nor-
ton, Safe and Sound Banking under the US Banking Act, 6 INT'L FIN. L. REV., Dec.
1987, at 13; Dufloux & Michel, Le Temps de la Rd-r~glementation Bancaire, 1987
BANQUE 1193, 1194.
7. The Big Bang Revisited. The Prospects for Securties Markets in Europe,
1987 REVUE DE LA BANQUE, No. 7, at 33; The Economics of 'Big Bang', supra note 1,
at 7-9. However, one can question whether the 1987 Wall Street Crash has not seri-
ously affected the U.S. firms' efforts to gain permission to engage directly in investment
and underwriting activities in the future. Comment: Shock Proof Glass, 6 INT'L FIN. L.
REV., Nov. 1987, at 2.
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erate in their oversight of financial conglomerates active in several mar-
ket segments. In a final evaluation, some of the U.S. re-regulation pro-
posals will be compared briefly with the instruments put in place in the
United Kingdom to achieve this regulatory cooperation.
2. THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
BEFORE "BIG BANG"
2.1. The Market Structure in the United Kingdom
2.1.1. Clearing Banks
The London clearing banks were the most important providers of
demand deposits for years. Because the clearing banks established cartel
agreements in key areas like interest rates on deposits and loans (ar-
rangements that were often condoned by the Bank of England) and
because they had exclusive control and ownership of the nation's major
funds transfer and check clearing system, entry into their oligopoly was
hardly possible.8
No license or other supervisory requirement governed the taking
of deposits from the public by institutions outside of the established
banking system, which meant that entering into competition with the
clearing banks in this area was relatively simple. When interest rates
rose and the standard of living increased, lucrative banking opportuni-
ties developed for institutions other than the clearing banks. Following
the post-war increase in personal income, these "secondary" banks
started exploiting new banking markets such as the financing of auto
and household good purchases as well as equipment leasing for
businesses.9
Loosening most of the restrictions on the clearing banks, however,
did not achieve the intended results. While the number of fringe banks
was not reduced, the total amount of outstanding credit (especially real
estate loans) grew and stimulated inflation. When restrictions were
later reimposed, the resulting fears and the uncertainty about the prop-
erty market led to the collapse of a finance company. The ensuing crisis
of confidence in the secondary banking market forced the Bank of Eng-
land to step in to mitigate the negative effect on the banking system as
8. Gardener, The City in Perspective, 1986 REVUE DE LA BANQUE, No. 3 at 5;
Governor of the Bank of England, supra note 1, at 207.
9. Clearing banks had been discouraged by the Bank of England from lending to
individuals or to property concerns in an effort to channel investments into the indus-
trial sector. Fforde, Competition, Innovation and Regulation in British Banking, 23
BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 363 (1983); Redslob, Le Centre Financier International de
Londres - 1. La Mutation, 1977 BANQUE 667.
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a whole. Following this "Life Boat" operation, ratio controls were ap-
plied to all banks, including the secondary banks, lending ceilings were
abolished and many of the clearing banks' longstanding agreements (in-
cluding the interest rate cartel) were abandoned."0
2.1.2. Building Societies
During the industrial revolution, mutual building societies were
formed to provide a mechanism for financing home purchases by work-
ers. These societies also were designed as a government policy instru-
ment for promoting private homeownership. They were not subject to
deposit rate ceilings and enjoyed favorable tax treatment. Restrictions
on the composition of building society assets, however, did not permit
deposit account overdrafts. As a result, the societies were precluded
from offering "checkable" current accounts, although the Building Soci-
eties Act permitted considerable latitude for diversification within the
legal restrictions."'
By offering deposit facilities, a consumer-friendly service and an
interest rate slightly higher than the one offered by the clearing banks'
cartel, the building societies gradually took on the function of holding
individual savings, even though the operational distinctions between
them and the clearing banks remained clear. From the early 1980s on,
however, the banks and the building societies have been in more direct
competition with each other. Banks started offering home mortgages,
which had been the traditional preserve of the building societies, and
the building societies reacted by getting involved in various fields in-
cluding savings schemes and automated teller machines. 2
These developments called into question the degree of specializa-
tion between banks and building societies in providing retail deposits. A
wider diversification, sought on behalf of the building societies, raised
the issue of the need for different forms of prudential control as well as
the potential need to change from mutual society to company status.
Proposals for the legislative reform of building societies were therefore
10. See Redslob, Le Centre Financier International de Londres - 2.
L'incertitude, 1977 BANQUE 837; D'Hav6 & Quintyn, supra note 1, at 99-100; Gar-
dener, supra note 8, at 7.
11. Jones, The Future of Building Societies, NAT'L WESTMINSTER BANK Q.
REV., May 1984, at 33; see Northedge, Building Societies at the Starting Gate, 137
THE BANKER, Jan. 1987, at 30; D'HavE & Quintyn, supra note 1, at 98.
12. COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE FUNCTIONING OF THE FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIONS, REPORT AND APPENDICES, 1980, CMND., No. 7937, at 247; H. MCRAE & F.
CAIRNCROSS, CAPITAL CITY: LONDON AS A FINANCIAL CENTRE 21-32 (rev. ed.
1985); Governor of the Bank of England, The Future of the Building Societes: A Cen-
tral Banker's View, 23 BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 216 (1983).
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limited to emphasizing the extension of the building societies' powers to
offer a full range of services, including insurance broking, to house pur-
chasers/owners rather than the extension of their powers within the
banking sector. These proposals ultimately reemerged in a refined form
in a Government green paper that formed the basis for the Building
Societies Act 1986.13
2.1.3. The Stock Exchange
The British Stock Exchange was organized in terms of a strict
separation of power between brokerage firms and dealers or so-called
jobbers. The brokers acted as agents for investors, arranging deals on
their behalf with jobbers for a minimum fixed commission. Brokers
were able directly to put through matched trades, but jobbers needed to
check the price before the trade could be completed and the transaction
had to take place through the jobbers' book. Brokers also managed in-
vestment portfolios and provided investment advice.14 The market itself
was composed of competing market makers or jobbers on the floor of
the Exchange. The jobber system was highly concentrated, and only
limited information was available on jobbers' quotes and the prices at
which deals were struck. Such limited disclosure of information on
prices was regarded as an important protection for the jobbers and
hence for the liquidity of the market.15 Member firms were known to
have only modest capital in comparison with firms in some foreign
markets. While there were no statutory restrictions on cross-ownership
of banks and securities firms and although banks had long been active
in Eurodollar issues, the stock exchange rules, especially the ownership
rules, effectively formed a barrier for sterling issues.1
2.2. The Regulatory Structure in the United Kingdom
The supervision or prudential regulation of banks was never an area
of major importance in British banking, and it hardly existed as a bank
13. See 47 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) 516, 517 (1986); Building Societies Given
Greater Scope to Diversify, Fin. Times, March 12, 1987, at 7; Brennan, Home Loan
Giants Look Up From Their Knitting, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1987, at 104; Hague, Facing
Up to a Cultural Challenge, Fin. Times, Jan. 9, 1987, at 32; Governor of the Bank of
England, supra note 12, at 218-19; Jones, supra note 11, at 43; Gardener, supra note
8, at 11.
14. H. McRAE & F. CAIRNCROSS, supra note 12, at 137-39; Jackson, Changes
in the Stock Exchange and Regulation of the City, 25 BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 544, 545
(1985).
15. Jackson, supra note 14, at 545.
16. Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, Changes in the Structure of the
Financial Markets: A View From London, 25 BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 75 (1985).
[Vol. 10:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol10/iss3/3
U.K. FINANCIAL SERVICES RE-REGULATION
regulatory function before the secondary banking crisis. The concen-
trated nature of the industry and its overall stability created the percep-
tion that no explicit legislation was necessary. The result was a system
of "moral suasion"-informal discussions with a bank's management
and general suggestions by the Bank of England addressed to the bank-
ing community. The existing supervision was focused on the Bank's
operational role as a central bank. Therefore, the system was almost
exclusively concerned with "supervising" members of the discount mar-
ket and accepting houses, which were prepared to accept the Bank's
supervision in exchange for a special market relationship with it.'
7
In August 1974, following the "Life Boat" operation, a voluntary
system for nearly all deposit takers was put in place, but it was ques-
tionable whether the system would continue to work once the crisis en-
ded. Following a Government white paper entitled "Licensing and Su-
pervision of Deposit Taking Institutions," legislative action was
undertaken, and the result was the Banking Act 1979. This Act was
intended to put the Bank involvement in industry supervision, which
had resulted from a spontaneous reaction to the crisis, on a statutory
footing."8
The Banking Act 1979 granted supervisory authority to the Bank
of England over all deposit taking institutions with the exception of the
building societies. The institutions involved were required to meet min-
imum managerial and financial requirements and to file periodic state-
ments of condition with the Bank.
At the same time, the Banking Act 1979 reinstated the traditional
distinction between clearing banks and licensed deposit takers. The Act
allowed the Bank of England to continue its close relationship with the
major banks while also giving it greater control over the licensed de-
posit takers. The Bank could thus maintain its basic philosophy of flex-
ibility in banking supervision and handle the day-to-day fulfillment of
its supervisory role without recourse to detailed legal provisions. 9
Although the Banking Act 1979 did not prove wholly satisfactory,
once again it took a crisis to make legislative change a high priority. In
1984, the Bank of England was forced to take over the banking inter-
ests of bullion dealer Johnson Matthey to save it from collapse. Many
of the shortcomings that were demonstrated by this incident had al-
ready been identified, but the Bank was unable to remedy them with-
17. Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, Supervision and Central Bank-
ing, 27 BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 380 (1987); Gardener, supra note 8, at 6.
18. Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, supra note 17, at 381.
19. See Cooke, The Role of the Banking Supervisor, 22 BANK ENG. Q. BULL.
547 (1982); Gardener, supra note 8, at 8.
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out new legislation."
The Government established a committee under the chairmanship
of the Governor of the Bank of England to consider any necessary
changes in the existing regulatory system.2" The committee's report was
published in June 1985 and made a number of recommendations aimed
at strengthening the existing system.22 A Government white paper, is-
sued after extensive deliberation, endorsed most of the suggestions that
had been made in the committee report. The resulting legislation desig-
nated the Bank of England as the supervisory authority for banks, and
a Board of Banking Supervision was to be established within the Bank
in order to assist Governor in the performance of his supervisory
duties.23
In the Bank opinion, the committee report and the White Paper
did not involve a fundamental change in the approach to banking su-
pervision in the United Kingdom. The intention was rather to tackle a
number of weaknesses which had become apparent both in the present
statutory framework and in its implementation.24
The Banking Act 1987 generally retains the system established
under the 1979 Act, but it abolishes the two tiered structure. All insti-
tutions are now referred to as "authorised institutions" that are defined
in terms of "deposit" and "deposit taking business." The 1987 Act pro-
hibits the acceptance of deposits in the United Kingdom in the course of
20. The Bank of England's Supervision Department had failed to pick up the
weakness of Johnson Matthey's loan portfolio and to warn the Bank of the scope of its
problems when it took over. H. MCRAE & F. CAIRNCROSS, supra note 12, at 238;
Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, Responsibilities of the Private and Public
Sectors, 24 BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 500 (1984); BANK OF ENGLAND, 1985 REPORT AND
ACCOUNTS 32; Governor of the Bank of England, The UK Approach to Financial
Regulation, 26 BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 48, 50 (1986); Blanden, UK Supervision: What
Banks Have To Do, 137 THE BANKER, Apr. 1987, at 49.
21. BANK OF ENGLAND, 1985 REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 37.
22. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE SET UP TO CONSIDER THE SYSTEM OF
BANKING SUPERVISION, 1985, CMND., No. 9550.
23. BANK OF ENGLAND, 1986 REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 41; HER MAJESTY'S
TREASURY, BANKING SUPERVISION REPORT, 1985 (Cmd. 9695). A banking bill,
designed to provide a statutory basis for the "important regulatory improvements"
which were identified in the White Paper was published on November 14, 1986. The
Government further announced that it had decided to set up, in cooperation with the
Bank of England, an independent review of the law relating to banking mechanisms
and practices. 47 WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) 949 (Dec. 15, 1986).
24. The Bank of England has intensified its program of supervisory visits. How-
ever, there is a need for adequate powers to be available to supervisors to deal with
those cases in which voluntary cooperation is not forthcoming. There is also a need to
increase the commercial experience of the supervisors in order to improve their capacity
to reach informed judgments on the banks they are supervising. BANK OF ENGLAND,
1986 REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 41-43; Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, Su-
pervision and Competitive Conditions, 26 BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 242 (1986).
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carrying on a deposit-taking business without the authorization of the
Bank of England. In light of the wide scope of this prohibition - it
extends beyond those institutions which might commonly be regarded
as "banks" to encompass institutions which finance their own busi-
nesses materially from deposits or from the interest earned on them -
it was necessary to provide for numerous exemptions.25
These exemptions are provided for under clause 4 of the Act, and
the general policy has been to grant exemptions where appropriate
safeguards to the depositors are in place. To improve the effectiveness
of the Act, clause 7 empowers the Treasury, in consultation with the
Bank, to amend the definitions of "deposit" and "deposit taking" by
secondary legislation in order to take into account developments in the
financial market.26
Instead of separating the supervisory functions from the other cen-
tral bank functions, as had been suggested in the Government White
Paper, the Board of Banking Supervision was created to advise the
Bank on broad issues involving supervision of the authorized institu-
tions. Therefore, the Bank Supervision Division has been reinforced.
Under the 1987 Act, the Bank has the power to revoke or restrict au-
thorization, to regulate invitations for deposits, to require information
and documents from authorized institutions, to order investigations and
to compel an authorized institution to provide it with such information
as the Bank may reasonably require for the performance of its func-
tions under the Act.2" There will also be a significant increase in the
role of auditors in monitoring and reporting on the systems established
by banks to ensure appropriate accounting for their activities."
The Building Societies Act 1962 gave responsibility for prudential
supervision of building societies to the Chief Registrar of the Friendly
Societies. The Chief Registrar promulgated regulations specifying
which liquid assets the societies were allowed to hold, mostly short and
medium term stock issued by the Government or by local authorities.29
Following the proposals for reform aimed at making the building
societies more competitive with banks by enlarging their powers, the
Building Societies Act 1986 was enacted. This Act has changed the reg-
ulatory structure of the societies by conferring regulatory powers over
them to a new Building Societies Commission. The Commission had to
25. See Lewis, The Banking Bill: Between Charybdis and Scylla, 2 J. INT'L
BANKING L. 49 (1987).
26. See id. at 53.
27. Lickorish, A Practitioner's Guide to The Banking Act 1987, 6 INT'L FIN.
L. REV., Nov. 1987, at 27-28.
28. Blanden, supra note 20, at 49.
29. See Brennan, supra note 13, at 104.
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publish new proposals on capital adequacy after its original proposal
had been attacked by the societies as too cautious, because it would
have left the societies with insufficient financial resources to take ad-
vantage of their new powers under the Act."0
The regulatory structure of the securities industry was based on
the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958 ("PFI Act"). 1 Under
the PFI Act, the Department of Trade and Industry would issue Con-
duct of Business Rules to be applied to recognized dealers.32 However,
the narrow definition of securities under the PFI Act and the exclusion
of investment advisers from its field of application led to gaps in its
coverage. The majority of the firms involved in the securities industry
were exempt from the need to obtain a license because of their mem-
bership in the Stock Exchange or in one of the eight associations of
securities dealers recognized by the DTI. The PFI Act further provided
for the exemption of institutions which dealt only incidentally in securi-'
ties, and most banks were able to benefit from the exemption by suc-
cessfully establishing that dealing in securities was only ancillary to
their principal business. The Bank of England never regulated the
banks' activities as issuing houses, fund managers or investment advis-
ers other than to ensure that they maintained their overall solvency. 3
30. See sources cited supra note 13.
31. The Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958 ("PFI Act"), however, is
not the only existing form of statutory regulation: the Companies Act 1980 contains
prospectus requirements, corporate disclosure rules and rules making insider trading a
criminal offense. In addition, the Industrial and Provident Societies Acts, the Building
Societies Act, the Banking Act 1979, the Insurance Companies Acts, the Policy Hold-
ers' Protection Act 1975 and the Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977, all contain
some provisions regulating the marketing of securities. L.C.B. GOWER, REVIEW OF
INVESTOR PROTECTION: A DISCUSSION DOCUMENT §§ 3.11-3.26 (1982) [hereinafter
DISCUSSION DOCUMENT]. This statutory regulation is supplemented by non-statutory
regulation. The Stock Exchange regulates the principal market in securities. Id. § 3.22.
The Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers administers the City Code on Take-Over and
Mergers. Id. § 3.27. The Council for the Securities Industry ("CSI") acts as the coor-
dinator of the self-regulatory bodies of which it is composed. Id. § 3.29. The City Code
and the Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers has no statutory backing, and the Panel's
authority rests on the acceptance of its rulings by the general financial community and
by the associations which make up its membership. McKenna, The Gower Report - A
British SEC?, 2 INT'L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1983, at 28.
32. In 1983, new Licensing Dealers (Conduct of Business) Rules were promul-
gated, and the Department of Trade and Industry ("DTI") took a tougher line on the
licensing of dealers. Pimlott, The Reform of Investor Protection in the U.K.: An Exam-
ination of the Proposals of the Gower Report and the U.K. Government's White Paper
of January, 1985, 7 J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. MARKET L. 141, 151 (1985); L.C.B.
GOWER, REVIEW OF INVESTOR PROTECTION: REPORT, PART I, 1984, CMND., No.
9125, §2.03 [hereinafter GOWER REPORT].
33. DISCUSSION DOCUMENT, supra note 31, § 9.08, Jackson, supra note 14, at
548; Pimlott, supra note 32, at 143.
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3. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK EMERGING AFTER THE ENACT-
MENT OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT 1986
3.1. Market Restructuring
The narrow scope of the PFI Act, the widely used possibility of
obtaining the status of an exempted dealer, and the lax enforcement of
the DTI all pointed towards the need for a comprehensive review of
investor protection. This was further highlighted by certain scandals
that occurred during 1981. In response, the Government commissioned
Professor L.C.B. Gower to review the existing system of investor
protection.3
This review of investor protection occurred at a time of great
change in the British securities markets. Due to the internationalization
of these markets, the members of the London Stock Exchange had to
compete at the international level. Although valuable to the position of
individual Exchange members, central elements of the Stock Exchange
rule book, such as the minimum-fixed commissions, the single capacity
system, and the ownership rules, were also responsible for the low capi-
talization of the Exchange members, which in turn led to their inability
to compete with foreign firms.3 5
Although many members of the Exchange had long recognized the
need to adapt to meet the various international challenges, no action
had been taken because of a peculiar set of circumstances. Following
the extension of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976 to cover
agreements relating to the provision of services, the Stock Exchange
registered its rule book as an agreement and the Office of Fair Trading
challenged the validity of this rule book under the Act. Professor
34. In February 1981, the investment management company Norton Warburg
collapsed with a deficit of some 2.5 million pounds, causing significant losses of money
by individual investors. The money had been invested in Norton Warburg's own group
of companies, which subsequently failed. Also, in March, the Stock Exchange had to
appoint a Committee of Investigation to conduct an inquiry into a stockbrokerage firm
in Manchester. Both cases involved conflicts of interest relating to investment manage-
ment, but the 1960 Licensed Dealers (Conduct of Business) Rules did not have provi-
sions requiring only disclosure. Once a firm had been licensed (as in the Norton
Warburg case), the customers would have very little protection. Pimlott, supra note 32,
at 146; Jackson, supra note 14, at 548; Wilkinson, Surveillance and Compliance, in
THE CITY AFTER THE FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT: A FINANCIAL TIMES CONFERENCE
§ 7.1 (1986). For a discussion of the regulatory system as laid down in the PFI Act, see
DISCUSSION DOCUMENT, supra note 31, §§ 3.01-3.10. For a discussion of the defects
of the regulatory system, see id. §§ 5.01-5.17 (mentioning the limited scope of the
system, the widely abused possibility of obtaining the status of an exempted dealer, the
lax enforcement policy, and the failure of the system to achieve the proper balance
between government regulation and self-regulation); see also, Stoakes, The London
Stock Exchange in Transition, 2 INT'L FIN. L. REV., Dec. 1983, at 12.
35. Stoakes, supra note 34, at 12.
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Gower's Discussion Document contained critical language with regard
to the self-regulatory powers of the Stock Exchange. Although it seems
a little extreme to read this as a proposal to eliminate the self-regula-
tory powers of the Stock Exchange, it is possible that in light of these
comments, the Stock Exchange was not willing to consider changes in
its rule book since such consideration might have weakened its
position. 6
Ultimately, the restrictive practices case was settled out of court.
In the so-called Goodison-Parkinson Agreement, the Government
agreed to drop the case before the Restrictive Practices Court in ex-
change for the Stock Exchange agreeing to dismantle the minimum
commissions by stages. However, the Stock Exchange did not promise
to change its dealing system or its membership arrangements. For a
time, the maintenance of the single capacity scheme and the retention of
the membership system were considered true possibilities.
3 7
It was by no means certain that single capacity could actually
work without fixed commissions. The reason why minimum commis-
sions were first introduced in London was explicitly because the single
capacity system had proved unworkable without them.38 Enough people
believed in this "link-argument" for the Stock Exchange to come to the
conclusion that a dual capacity system had to be introduced with the
abolition of fixed commissions. However, a dual capacity system would
increase the need for member firms to have free access to outside capital
and in turn force the Stock Exchange to change the ownership rules.3 9
Therefore, as of March 1, 1986, a single non-member was allowed to
own 100 percent of a member firm, but all Stock Exchange members
had to remain separately capitalized entities within any wider grouping
and the moratorium on the creation of new member firms with outside
financing was lifted. Dual capacity dealing by Stock Exchange mem-
bers in non-U.K. stocks has been allowed since April 1984, when the
Stock Exchange removed the minimum commission schedules for deals
36. See Pimlott, supra note 32, at 151; Stoakes, supra note 34, at 12; Jackson,
supra note, 14, at 546.
All important will be the reaction of The Stock Exchange. It would wreck
any prospect of proceeding on these lines if it maintained the view that its
members must continue to be left to the exclusive control of the Exchange
and that the Exchange must continue to be free from any Governmental
supervision however residual.
DISCUSSION DOCUMENT, supra note 31, § 7.11.
37. See Stoakes, supra note 34, at 12-13; see also Pimlott, supra note 32, at 152.
38. I. KERR, BIG BANG 30-34 (1986).
39. Boudrillon, Le Big Bang - Rkvolution ou Droute?, 1986 BANQUE 1068,
1069-70; Jackson, supra note 14, at 546; Deputy Governor of the Bank of England,
supra note 16, at 77.
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in overseas securities. The same arrangement has been applied to U.K.
securities themselves since October 27, 1986, the date of "Big Bang. "40
Dual capacity, negotiated commissions, and automatic quotations
all forced market participants to reinforce their capital structure, link
up with the quotation system and reorganize their trading teams. In
this restructuring, one could opt for a financial conglomerate in the
underlying belief that the future belongs to those firms that can simul-
taneously offer issuing, underwriting, dealing and distribution, or one
could believe in the viability of traditional functions within the new
market and decide to remain independent. Finally, a firm could decide
to wait and see in the belief that once single capacity is removed, there
will be a necessary shake-up in light of the number of new entrants."'
Just as this diversification raised organizational questions for the
individual firms, it also raised questions about the organization of the
regulatory structure, already under review by Professor Gower, because
of its ineffectiveness. The removal of barriers between types of busi-
nesses that had traditionally been kept separate increased the scope of
conflicts of interest. These issues needed to be addressed in the Gower
review and the ensuing legislation.
3.2. Professor Gower's Proposals
Following a series of informal discussions with a number of pro-
fessional bodies and individuals, Professor Gower published a Discus-
sion Document.42 In light of the changes in the securities industry over
the past fifty years and the defects of the existing regulatory system, he
was convinced of the need for a redistribution of responsibilities be-
tween governmental regulators and self-regulatory bodies (and between
statutory and non-statutory regulation).43 Having reviewed the relative
advantages and disadvantages of both self-regulation and governmental
regulation, Professor Gower came up with five possible lines of reform
but he retained only the fifth as feasible: "[i]t should be the role of
government to decide major questions involving public policy but dis-
cretionary day to day regulation is better handled by self-regulatory
agencies." '44
40. Ingram, Change in The Stock Exchange and Regulation of the City, 27
BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 54 (1987); Jackson, supra note 14, at 546-47.
41. See The City of London: What Went Wrong in Learning to Manage - A
Survey of the City of London, THE ECONOMIST, June 25, 1988, at 3-11.
42. See DIscussioN DOCUMENT, supra note 31, §§ 1.02-1.04.
43. Id. § 5.17.
44. The other alternatives were: (1) retention of the status quo; (2) revision of
the PFI Act (this was rejected since it would not reduce government involvement and
instead it would increase the work load of civil servants in day-to-day regulation); (3)
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This adjusted balance between governmental regulation and self-
regulation could not be implemented immediately. There were not
enough self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") to cover all the fields.
Even the most respected SROs had not thoroughly adjusted their con-
stitution and rules in recognition of their public role,45 and the existing
SROs did not operate within a comprehensive statutory framework in
which the Government performed only supervisory or residual roles."'
Professor Gower proposed for discussion a new regulatory framework
of four self-regulatory agencies based on functional lines: one for the
dealings on the Stock Exchange; one for the dealings of the Stock Ex-
change and investment management advice; one for unit trusts; and a
Take-Over and Issues Agency. The existing Council for the Securities
Industry ("CSI")47 was suggested as an "umbrella body" to coordinate
and supervise the new agencies."8 The proposed regulatory framework
would break down in this way:
NEW SECURITIES ACT
GOVERNMENT
Public Issues and The Stock Exchange
Take-Over Agency
An amalgam of the Take-Over Panel and It would remain
the Quotations Department of the Stock responsible for the
Exchange, it would be responsible for regulation of the central
prescribing the contents of and scrutinizing market of the Stock
prospectuses in respect to listed and Exchange and stock
unlisted securities, whether or not in broking and jobbing
connection with a take-over, operations of its
member firms.
coordination of the PFI Act with other controls (this was rejected since it would do
nothing to establish a more coherent and better balanced relationship between govern-
ment regulation and self-regulation); (4) establishment of a Securities Commission (this
was rejected since the Government did not want another "QUANGO" or Quasi Au-
tonomous Non-Governmental Organization and since the City objected to it). Id. §§
7.02-7.09.
45. Id. § 7.10.
46. Id.
47. See Stoakes, supra note 34, at 12.
48. DISCUSSION DOCUMENT, supra note 31, § 8.22.
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CSI
The Third Agency Unit Trust Agency
An unspecified body that would be It would regulate all
responsible for the regulation of over-the- unit trusts and other
counter markets, dealings off the Stock mutual funds and
Exchange, and investment advice, would prescribe what
types of trusts would be
allowed to market units
and how.49
Under Professor Gower's proposals, a Securities Act would replace the
PFI Act and include redrafted provisions, at that time found in the
Companies Act, relating to the issuing and distribution of securities. It
would be an offense to carry on unregistered business in securities. Se-
curities would be defined broadly but as clearly as possible.50 Registra-
tion would be through membership in or registration with an appropri-
ate self-regulatory agency recognized by the DTI."
This "ideal" system was primarily concerned with the regulation
of securities dealings. Professor Gower saw no reason to disturb the
present regulation of banking or deposit-taking as such.2 Although he
pointed out that banks would "of course" be affected by any new secur-
ities legislation in so far as they carried on business as issuing houses,
fund managers or investment advisers,53 no attempt was made to deal
with this overlap in regulatory powers.
Although the City institutions generally accepted the urgent need
for a new Securities Act, most of the responses published by bodies
representing City institutions were hostile to Gower's other conclu-
sions." A number of responses urged "that it would not be practicable
to establish self-regulatory agencies based, as the Discussion Document
[had] suggested, on a functional division of investment business, but
that, in light of the way in which the investment industry had devel-
oped, they would have to be based instead on its present professional
49. McKenna, supra note 31, at 30.
50. DISCUSsioN DOCUMENT, supra note 31, § 8.02.
51. Id. § 8.03.
52. Professor Gower did, however, suggest the removal of an overlap which ex-
isted between licensing under the PFI Act and licensing under the Banking Act 1979
when a securities dealer benefited from the use of a client's money. According to
Gower, this came under the definition of a deposit-taking activity as defined in the
Banking Act 1979. Id. §§ 3.14, 9.07.
53. Under the PFI Act, banks engaged in these activities as exempted dealers are
not subject to the Conduct Rules issued by the DTI. See supra note 33 and accompa-
nying text.
54. McKenna, supra note 31, at 31.
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and commercial groupings."55 Notwithstanding the fact that these criti-
cisms attacked some of the basic elements of the proposed regulatory
structure, Professor Gower, in his Final Report published in January
1984, claimed that the responses to his Discussion Document revealed a
clear consensus in favor of a comprehensive system of regulation within
a statutory framework primarily based on self-regulation subject to
Government surveillance."
3.3. The DTI White Paper and the Financial Services Bill
Although the debate on how best to regulate the securities industry
intensified following the publication of Professor Gower's Final Report,
by mid-1984 the focus of the debate had begun to shift away from the
issues of controlling investment managers and advisers to the question
of how to control conflicts of interest across a much broader area.5"
This concern arose out of the realignments among banks, stock brokers,
investment managers, discount houses and others in the London finan-
cial community that were brought about by the prospect of the end of
minimum commissions.5" When the industry could not agree on the
role to be performed by the CSI, the Governor of the Bank of England
asked an advisory group under the chairmanship of Sir Martin Jacomb
to come forward with proposals of its own. Although the report of this
advisory group was never published, it is said that its content may be
gleaned from the DTI's 1985 White Paper on financial services in the
United Kingdom. 9 Following Professor Gower's proposals, the DTI
wanted its regulatory system to be one of self-regulation within a statu-
tory framework. 0 However, contrary to what Professor Gower had
proposed, the DTI wished to place the responsibility for authorizing
investment businesses upon one or more private sector bodies.61 Such
55. Id.; GOWER REPORT, supra note 32, § 2.04.
56. GOWER REPORT, supra note 32, § 203.
57. Pimlott, supra note 32, at 159.
58. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
59. Governor of the Bank of England, The Future of the Securities Market, 24
BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 189, 193 (1984); Berrill, Regulation in a Changing City - Bu-
reaucrats and Practitioners, MIDLAND BANK REV., Summer 1986, at 16. The Gov-
ernment published its proposals for a new system of regulation for the financial services
industry of the United Kingdom in a "White Paper". DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND
INDUSTRY, FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: A NEW FRAMEWORK
FOR INVESTOR PROTECTION, 1985 (Cmd. 9432) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER]; see gen-
erally Abrams, The Financial Services White Paper. A Legal Analysis, 6 THE COM-
PANY LAW. 77, 77-81, 122-26 (1985) (evaluating the DTI's proposals).
60. WHITE PAPER, supra note 59, § 5.1.
61. The industry had expressed a preference for
a board composed of practitioners and lay members, exercising powers
transferred by Government but not part of Government, taking on the role
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body or bodies would have to be developed while legislation was under
consideration in Parliament, therefore allowing delegation of authority
once the legislation was enacted.62 The DTI made clear that it was
prepared to accept a single body if the financial services industry and
its customers would conclude that there were advantages in a single
body, but it believed that an effective system could be based on two
bodies."3 For convenience, these bodies were referred to as a Securities
and Investments Board and a Marketing of Investments Board.64 Al-
though the very important contributions made to self-regulation by the
Stock Exchange and other bodies were recognized, it was made clear
that the new structure would be function-based. 5 Recognizing that
there would be overlapping regulatory responsibilities, 66 the DTI in-
sisted that the need for multiple authorization of investment business
should be kept to a minimum. To facilitate cooperation between the
various regulatory bodies, it proposed enabling "information to be
transferred between regulators, subject to necessary safeguards.
'6
The DTI White Paper left a great many questions unanswered. It
was clear that banks would no longer be able to enjoy the status of
exempted dealer and that they would come unddr the newregulation.
However, the role of the Bank of England within this new framework
was unclear.
68
that Professor Gower had envisaged for the free-standing agency/commis-
sion. The essence of this body however, would be the strong practitioner
element on its board, and the private status that would permit it a freer
hand than would otherwise be the case in securing the staff and other
resources necessary to do a proper job.
Berrill, supra note 59, at 16. The fact that the Secretary of State had also been "influ-
enced" by a second advisory group (formed by the chairman of the Life Offices Associ-
ation) probably explains why the White Paper proposed two bodies sitting at the top of
the regulatory pyramid.
62. The Government would seek Parliamentary approval for regulatory powers
to be given to the Secretary of State, who would be enabled to delegate these powers to
anyone who appeared to meet the criteria set out in the legislation. This designated
body would be able to recognize self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") and have au-
thority over their rules and practices. WHITE PAPER, supra note 59, §§ 5.8-5.9.
63. Id. § 5.3.
64. Id.
65. Id. § 5.4.
66. Such overlaps have been described as "not a new phenomenon to which re-
cent developments were likely to give greater significance." Id. § 5.13.
67. Id.
68. Abrams, supra note 59, at 77. One of the major problems of the White Pa-
per and the Financial Services Bill was the failure to recognize the Euromarket as a
separate entity in need of a different form of regulation. The initial reaction of the
Euromarket was that since it did not deal with the British public, and its market had
been free from scandal, the whole thing had nothing to do with them. The Bank of
England, however, soon made it clear that exclusion from the first draft of the Bill did
not mean similar freedom from the new laws. Why Us?, EUROMONEY, Big Bang Sup-
1988]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
Before the Financial Services Bill was introduced in Parliament,
the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry set up the Marketing of
Investment Board Organizing Committee ("MIBOC") in March 1985
and the Securities and Investment Board ("SIB" or "the Board") in
June 1985. From the very beginning, SIB and MIBOC worked closely
together and decided in mid-1986 to merge into the present Securities
and Investment Board, agreeing that it would be more effective to have
one overall body. 9
The Financial Services Bill was published in November 1985. As
could have been expected, it went through a lengthy committee stage
where it was subjected to a number of amendments from two opposing
lobbies. Whereas the consumer lobby took the point of view that the
Bill did not go far enough, the industry lobby undertook every possible
effort to curb the scope of the Bill.
7 0
3.4. The Financial Services Act 1986 - Delegation of Regulatory
Powers to a Designated Agency
The Financial Services Act ("the Act") ultimately received Royal
Consent on November 7, 1986. Its 212 articles and 17 schedules form a
289-page document entitled: "An Act to regulate the carrying on of
investment business, to make related provisions with regard to insur-
ance business and business carried by friendly societies; to make provi-
sions with respect to the official listing of securities, offers of unlisted
securities, take-overs and insider trading; to make provisions as to the
disclosure of information obtained under enactments relating to fair
trading, banking and insurance; to make provisions for securing reci-
procity with other countries in respect of facilities for the provisions of
financial services; and for connected purposes." Most interesting to the
present discussion is the regulation of investment business as provided
plement, Aug. 1986, at 27; Jackson, supra note 14, at 550. In a defensive action, the
Euromarket created the International Securities Regulatory Organization ("ISRO") to
become an SRO and to protect the Euromarket's interests as the new regulation took
shape. I. KERR, supra note 38, at 85; Governor of the Bank of England, supra note 20,
at 49; World Welcomes Watchdogs, EUROMONEY, June 1986, at 87; Agnew, Capital
Adequacy, in THE CITY AFTER THE FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT: A FINANCIAL TIMES
CONFERENCE § 6.1 (1986).
69. SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS BOARD, FINANCIAL SERVICES: A GUIDE TO
THE NEw REGULATORY SYSTEM 4 (1986); McDougall, Control & Conflict, 136 THE
BANKER, Apr. 1986, at 32-33. While the Financial Services Bill was under considera-
tion, SIB started working on rules and sent out consultation documents in the form of
detailed papers. For an overview, see Blanden, Big Bang, 136 THE BANKER, Oct.
1986, at 31.
70. Morris, Financial Services Act: What It Means for Banks, 2 J. INT'L
BANKING L. 147, 148 (1987).
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for in Part I of the Act.
In regulating "inve.tment business" rather than "investment insti-
tutions," the Act introduces an entirely new regulatory structure which
covers fields in which both clearing banks and building societies had
been increasingly extending their activities. As could have been ex-
pected following Professor Gower's proposal and the DTI White Pa-
per, the definitions of what constitutes "'carrying on investment busi-
ness" are extremely wide, although it is considered implicit that in
order to amount to "investment business" the investment activities (as
listed in Schedule 1 to the Act) must be frequent enough and have the
necessary characteristics to be viewed as business transactions. Escape
routes that exist in that regard will most likely not be available, how-
ever, to most financial institutions including clearing banks and build-
ing societies, because the exceptions were intended to remove marginal
cases from the ambit of the Act.
71
The breadth of the definitions used in the Act will thus result in
the new regulatory structure having an impact on the entire United
Kingdom financial services industry. Firms active in this industry will,
pursuant to Sections 3 and 4 of the Act, have to become either an au-
thorized person under Chapter III of the Act or an exempted person
under Chapter IV of the Act.
Under Chapter III of the Act, an individual is an authorized per-
son if he is a member of a recognized self-regulatory agency72 or if he is
certified by a recognized professional body.7 3 There are special provi-
sions for insurance companies, 74 friendly societies7 5 and collective in-
71. Id. at 147-49.
72. A recognized self-regulatory body is defined as a body which regulates the
carrying on of investment business of any kind by enforcing rules which are binding on
persons carrying on business of that kind either because they are members of that body
or because they are otherwise subject to its control. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60,
§ 9.
73. A recognized professional body ("RPB") is defined as a body which regulates
the practice of a profession, and references to the practice of a profession do not include
reference to carrying on a business consisting wholly or mainly of investment business.
Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, § 16(1). This provision provides a regulatory
structure for the investment business (mostly investment advice) conducted by solicitors
and accountants. Their professional bodies can seek recognition as regulators. However,
the SIB expects the RPBs to regulate investment businers carried on only in the course
of or in conjunction with the practice of the profession while non-incidental business is
to be regulated by an appropriate SRO or by the SIB itself. SECURITIES AND INVEST-
MENTS BOARD, SIB's APPROACH TO ITS REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITIES (AN ADDI-
TIONAL STATEMENT SUBMITTED TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE AS A SUPPLEMENT
TO THE DRAFT RULES AND REGULATIONS) 43 (1987) [hereinafter ADDITIONAL
STATEMENT].
74. Since insurance companies are subject to the Insurance Companies Act 1982,
there is no need for authorization if they conduct no other investment business or do not
violate § 16 of the Insurance Companies Act. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, §
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vestment schemes. 76 A person can be authorized under the Act without
being a member of a SRO or a professional body by obtaining the di-
rect authorization of the Secretary of State. 7
Exempted persons are the Bank of England,78 the recognized in-
vestment exchanges, 79 clearing houses, 0 Lloyd's of London,8  the
money market institutions which are listed with the Bank of England
(but only with regard to the activities mentioned in schedule 50 of the
Act), 2 and the appointed representatives.83
The Act provides for the Secretary of State to write rules regulat-
ing the conduct of investment business by authorized persons. Those
rules will not apply, however, to members of recognized self-regulatory
organizations or persons certified by a recognized professional body
with respect to the carrying on of investment business for which they
are subject to the rules of the organization or body. 4
Both the SROs and the professional bodies must be recognized by
22.
75. See Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, § 23 (discussing the activities in
Schedule 1 of the Friendly Societies Act 1974).
76. Id. § 24.
77. Id. § 25.
78. Id. § 35.
79. Id. § 36. The Financial Services Act distinguishes between the functions of
market regulators and exchanges, whereas these functions had been jointly exercised by
the Stock Exchange in the past. The difference between an exchange and an SRO is
that an SRO authorizes and regulates firms and their conduct towards their clients,
while an exchange regulates markets and the conduct of persons who use it toward
each other. Grass, Internationalization of the Securities Trading Markets, 9 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 17, 26 (1986).
80. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, § 38.
81. Id. § 42.
82. Id. § 43. This exemption is an example of attempts undertaken to minimize
overlaps by adjusting the boundaries of supervisory responsibility. The wholesale
money market would normally have fallen within the ambit of the Financial Services
Act. However, the Bank of England had long overseen the conduct of business in for-
eign exchanges, bullion and wholesale banking on a non-statutory basis and is itself a
major participant in this market, carrying on its daily operational function on behalf of
the Government. In early 1986 it was decided that the Bank of England should remain
responsible for the supervision of those markets, and the Financial Services Bill was
amended to omit those transactions which will be supervised by the Bank. Galpin,
Keynote Address, in THE CITY AFTER THE FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT: A FINANCIAL
TIMES CONFERENCE § 4.2 (1986); Ingram, supra note 40, at 63.
83. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, § 44. Under the Financial Services Act,
conduct of business rules apply to insurance companies and friendly societies only in
respect of "marketing" policies and the management and marketing of pension funds,
and the financial resources rules do not apply. SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS BOARD,
THE SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS BOARD'S APPLICATION FOR DESIGNATED
AGENCY STATUS UNDER THE TERMS OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT AND THE
REVISED RULE BOOK DATED FEBRUARY 1987: EXPLANATORY STATEMENT § 8
(1987) [hereinafter EXPLANATORY STATEMENT].
84. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, § 48(1).
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the Secretary of State. The requirements for the recognition of SROs
are in Schedule 2 of the Financial Services Act. These requirements
provide explicitly that the rules and practices of the organization must
ensure that its members are fit and proper persons to carry on invest-
ment business of the kind with which the organization is concerned.
The recognition process also requires that the intra-organization rules
provide the investor with protection at least equivalent to that afforded
investors in investment businesses of the same kind directly authorized
by the Secretary of State.85
Section 114 of the Act authorizes the Secretary of State to make an
order to transfer all or any of the functions he has under Part I of the
Financial Services Act to a corporate body86 which is able and willing
to discharge any of these functions and meets the requirements of
Schedule 7 attached to the Act.8" Under Section 114(2), however, the
first order transferring these powers must be a transferral to the Secur-
ities and Investments Board, thereby making it the first designated
agency. The Secretary can only transfer his functions if the designated
agency has furnished him with a copy of the rules and regulations
which it proposes to make in the exercise of those functions, if he is
satisfied that those rules and regulations will afford investors an ade-
quate level of protection and if the proposed order has obtained parlia-
mentary approval.88
The key role in the whole regulatory structure will undoubtedly
be played by the Securities and Investment Board. The SIB receives its
powers from the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, but this
authority can also be withdrawn.89 Sir Kenneth Berrill, the former
Chairman of the SIB,90 has made it clear that no one on the SIB is
appointed to represent a particular interest or sector of the market.
85. Id. sched. 2, § 3(1). Similar provisions are set forth in Schedule 3 with re-
gard to the recognition of professional bodies.
86. 86. Id. § 114.
87. Under Schedule 7, the designated agency must have adequate arrangements
for the discharge of its functions, a satisfactory system of monitoring and enforcement,
arrangements for investigation of complaints and arrangements for the promotion and
maintenance of standards. Id. sched. 7.
88. Id. sched. 9, § 1.
89. The SIB is composed of persons with relevant business experience as well as
those who are customers of investment business. Id. sched. 7, § 3.
90. On February 26, 1988, the DTI notified Berrill that he would not be reap-
pointed as the chairman of the SIB. In May, Berrill was replaced by David Walker,
who was formerly with the Bank of England and was one of the architects of Big Bang.
Although the new appointment involves a man who was previously an executive in the
industry which the SIB polices, the general opinion in the City is that Walker will be a
forceful and consistent leader. See Blame the Law, Not the Sheriff, THE ECONOMIST,
Mar. 5, 1988, at 19-20; From Berrill Lynch to Slater Walker, THE ECONOMIST, Mar.
5, 1988, at 81.
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Berrill has stated:
Their background is important for the knowledge and expe-
rience that they can bring to bear on the problems that con-
front them as a board, [but] all of the Board's members must
be independent and they must not under any circumstances,
see themselves as appointed to argue the corner for the inter-
ests of their own firm or market.9
Several features were built into the regulatory structure in order to
avoid undue influence by SROs on the SIB's rules:
- The Chairman of the Board and its members will be ap-
pointed by the Secretary of State and the Governor of the
Bank of England.92
- The Secretary of State has the power to resume regulatory
responsibility from the Board if it ceases to conform to the
requirements set out in the legislation.93
- The Board is under an obligation to report annually to the
Secretary of State who must submit these reports to
Parliament. 4
- The decisions of the Board on authorization of investment
businesses and on disciplinary matters are referable to an in-
dependent tribunal appointed by the Lord Chancellor and
the Secretary of State. 5
- The Secretary of State is able to require the revocation or
the amendment of the rules of the Board if they are contrary
to the United Kingdom's international obligations.96
- After obtaining advice from the Director General of Fair
Trading, the Secretary of State can require the Board to
change or remove a rule if it is judged detrimental to compe-
tition to an extent unjustified by the requirements of investor
protection.
At the beginning of February 1987, the SIB officially requested
the Secretary of State to make it the first designated agency under the
Act and made its rulebook public. The rulebook was reviewed by the
Secretary of State from the point of view of effective investor protection
91. Berrill, supra note 59, at 16.
92. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, sched. 7, § 1.
93. Id. § 115.
94. Id. § 117.
95. Id. § 97(1).
96. Id. § 192(1).
97. Id. § 120.
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and by the Director General of the Office of Fair Trading from the
point of view of its impact on competition. This procedure ultimately
resulted in the desired recognition being conferred on May 18, 1987.98
The DTI White Paper had suggested some possible SROs: The
Stock Exchange,99 the Association of Futures Brokers and Dealers
("AFBD"), 0° and the National Association of Securities Dealers and
Investment Managers ("NASDIM").' 01 However, not all investment
businesses within reach of the Act were willing to obtain authorization
from one or more of these bodies. As a result, the SIB and the MIBOC
began talks with other organizations, 0 2 including the International Se-
curities Regulatory Organization ("ISRO"), 03 the Investment Man-
agement Regulatory Organization ("IMRO"),"' the Life Assurance
and Unit Trust Regulatory Organization ("LAUTRO"),0 5 and the
98. EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 83, § 2; Ingram, supra note 40, at
62; Niyonzima, The Supervision Over Investment Businesses in the United Kingdom
Under the Financial Services Act (FSA) 1986, 1987 REVUE DE LA BANQUE, No. 8, at
30.
99. Coverage: Firms dealing and broking in securities and related options and
futures; investment management and advice incidental to this business. SECURITIES
AND INVESTMENTS BOARD, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT BUSINESS: THE NEW
FRAMEWORK 8 (1986) [hereinafter, THE NEW FRAMEWORK]; see ADDITIONAL STATE-
MENT, supra note 73, at 39; Ingram, supra note 40, at 64.
100. Coverage: Firms dealing and broking in futures and options; investment
management and advice incidental to this business. THE NEW FRAMEWORK, supra
note 98, at 8; see ADDITIONAL STATEMENT, supra note 73, at 40; Ingram, supra note
40, at 64.
101. Coverage: Firms dealing and broking in securities and collective investment
products; investment managers and advisers. THE NEW FRAMEWORK, supra note 99,
at 8; see ADDITIONAL STATEMENT, supra note 73, at 40; Ingram, supra note 40, at
64.
102. With a view to reducing potential overlap, the SIB and MIBOC en-
couraged LUTIRO and NASDIM to merge, resulting in the Financial Intermediaries
Mangers & Brokers Regulatory Association ("FIMBRA"). THE NEW FRAMEWORK,
supra note 99, § 1.12. ADDITIONAL STATEMENT, supra note 73, at 40; Ingram, supra
note 40, at 64. This number was further reduced to five when the Stock Exchange and
International Securities Regulatory Organization ("ISRO") merged into the Securities
Association. ADDITIONAL STATEMENT, supra note 73, at 39; Ingram, supra note 40,
at 55-56. The SIB has expressed the belief that together these five SROs should form a
satisfactory structure, capable of providing for the whole range of investment business.
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT, supra note 73, at 37; McDougall, supra note 69, at 33-34.
103. Coverage: Firms dealing and broking in seburities, international money
market instruments, forward agreements, and related futures and options. THE NEW
FRAMEWORK, supra note 99, at 8; see ADDITIONAL STATEMENT, supra note 73, at 39;
Ingram, supra note 40, at 55-56.
104. Coverage: Investment managers and advisers, including managers and trust-
ees of collective investment schemes and in-house pension fund managers. THE NEW
FRAMEWORK, supra note 99, at 8; see ADDITIONAL STATEMENT, supra note 73, at 41
Ingram, supra note 40, at 64.
105. Coverage: Life companies and unit trust managers and trustees, for the
management and selling of insurance-linked investments or units in a collective invest-
ment scheme by themselves and their tied sales forces. THE NEW FRAMEWORK, supra
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Life and Unit Trust Intermediaries Regulatory Organization ("LU-
TIRO").10 6 Ultimately the SIB would recognize FIMBRA, AFBD,
TSA, IMRO and LAUTRO as SROs.
The SIB intended SROs to have scope rules; 07 the effect of these
rules would be to limit the kind of activities members may engage in
unless otherwise authorized." 8 Membership in an SRO will thus not
necessarily permit a firm to engage in all types of investment business.
In this regard, a number of firms would be forced to join more than
one SRO or combine membership in an SRO with direct authorization
by the SIB in order to do a full range of investment business.10 9 In
addition, the SROs would have no freedom in setting capital adequacy
standards, and their conduct of business rules would have to be
equivalent to the rules prescribed by the SIB.110
It thus seemed extreme to believe that the SIB would depend so
strongly on the SROs to monitor their respective markets, or that the
SIB would have to give in to their collective bargaining power.11
Rather it was empirically clear that the organizations were similarly
committed and were taking measures to secure compliance with the
new requirements because of a recognition that the changes were inevi-
table. However, it was also true that some aspects of the legislation
failed to engage their enthusiasm. This was not too surprising in view
of the complexity of the rules being developed by the SIB which in-
volved significant changes from their prior practices.11 2 For example, in
considering an SRO for recognition, the SIB intended to pay close at-
tention to the SRO's likely ability and willingness to act promptly upon
any lead given by the SIB in tightening requirements in a particular
note 99 at 8; see ADDITIONAL STATEMENT, supra note 73, at 41; Ingram, supra note
40, at 64.
106. Coverage: Insurance and unit trust intermediaries, so far as their business is
limited to life assurance and unit trust products. THE NEW FRAMEWORK, supra note
99, at 8; see ADDITIONAL STATEMENT, supra note 73, at 40; Ingram, supra note 40,
at 64.
107. For an indication of the expected scope, see infra notes 112-19 and accom-
panying text. For a more detailed discussion, see ADDITIONAL STATEMENT supra note
73, at 37-41.
108. THE NEw FRAMEWORK, supra note 99, § 1.10.
109. See Finance Brief British Investor's Bill of Rights, THE ECONOMIST, Apr.
30, 1988, at 92.
110. The result is supposed to be the avoidance of a multiline financial services
company arbitraging against the cost of the rule by packaging an investment as one
kind of product instead of another. 47 WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) 546 (1986).
111. Dannen, Faces of the New City, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, June 1986, at
77 (int'l ed.).
112. Woodley, Foreword to REGULATION AND THE FINANCIAL SERVICES BILL,
A SURVEY OF SENIOR EXECUTIVES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT BUSINESS
(available from Deloitte Haskins & Sells of London).
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area.1 1 3
3.5. Functional Self-Regulation
The statutory system of regulation that has been put in place
makes room for self-regulation subject to certain conditions and within
certain carefully defined limits.1 4 The whole system is full of checks
and balances to ensure that the SROs do not become cozy clubs and
cartels.
The relationship between the City and the Government in the
United Kingdom has traditionally been one of informal contacts, mu-
tual trust and self-regulation in which self-regulation was seen as hav-
ing a dual function: a channel to the Government as well as a control
mechanism for the Government. The Bank of England, for example,
supervised the City" 5 and served as a channel for communicating the
City's views to the Government at the same time. 16
Central to this system of self-regulation was the mutual affinity
existing between the regulators and the regulated. One of the explana-
tions for the secondary banking crisis was that the newcomers did not
abide by the "normal rules of banking" even though no statutory provi-
sion forced them to do so." 7 Although the Banking Act 1979 put in
place a more formal regulatory system, the Bank of England still pre-
ferred to try to use informal channels where possible to enforce its
wishes.
By virtue of Section 150 of the PFI Act, the members of the Stock
Exchange were exempted from having to apply for a license to deal in
securities. The entire regulation was thereby left to the Stock Exchange
which regulated both primary issues and the behavior of its members.
This self-regulation without any form of supervision11 witnessed sev-
eral financial scandals at the beginning of the 1980s, and the Govern-
ment was forced to consider the idea that, "even if it were practicable,
113. THE NEW FRAMEWORK, supra note 99, § 2.17. This criterion can still be
implied from the general tone of the additional statement but is no longer explicitlx
mentioned.
114. Berrill, supra note 59, at 15.
115. It relied on government by way of consensus to obtain the desired result.
116. The Bank of England had encouraged the establishment of both the Take-
over Panel and the Council for the Securities Industry. Graham, The Bank of Eng-
land, the City and the Reform of the Stock Exchange: Continuing the Self-Regulatory
Community?, 36 N. IRELAND LEGAL Q. 122, 130-133 (1985).
117. See H. McRAE & F. CAIRNCROSS, supra note 12, at 237 ("[T]he fringe
banks could exist because of a regulatory gap which grew up between the Bank and the
DTI."); see also Graham, supra note 116, at 138; Gardener, supra note 8, at 7-8.
118. However, there is the theoretical possibility of the DTI withdrawing recog-
nition from the Stock Exchange.
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we do not regard it as acceptable that the regulation of financial insti-
tutions should be left entirely to the institutions themselves." '119
The SIB rules introduced surveillance and compliance, no longer
voluntary but compulsory, into the British financial services industry.
In this respect, the new system clearly departs from the past; the City
relied on regulation as being equal to simple compliance with the rules
for too long. The events of 1981 made it clear that this reliance was
misplaced. Even though the Stock Exchange hurried to set up an In-
spectorate to ensure surveillance and compliance,"' 0 public opinion
forced the Government to step in. Once Professor Gower's Final Re-
port, the DTI White Paper and the Financial Services Bill had been
published, the universal reaction within the City was that the Bill's
statutory provisions and range of powers were tougher than expected.
Nevertheless, much power has been left in the hands of the market
itself. Most agreed, however, that it would not take much to turn the
SIB into a Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") type institu-
tion, especially in the wake of the Guinness insider trading scandal. 2 '
The simultaneous deregulation of the City in terms of removing
all existing barriers between segments of the financial services indus-
try122 and re-regulation of private investor protection through a statu-
tory framework,1 23 which provided for functionally based SROs, neces-
sarily led to the problem of firms being confronted with more than one
regulator. The new framework is characterized by multipurpose firms
subject to regulation by supervisors organized along functional lines.
This proliferation of supervision could lead to duplication of reporting
efforts and increased costs. There is the potential for confusion about
the various supervisors and a considerable area for conflict between
their requirements. This could encourage financial groups to structure
themselves according to the perceived laxity or stringency of different
supervisors rather than the financial and managerial requirements of
any group's operations.124 The problems of functional regulation
hereby created will be further discussed in the next part.
119. WILSON COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE FUNCTIONING OF FINANCIAL IN-
STITUTIONS, 1980 (Cmd. 7937) at 1108.
120. Wilkinson, supra note 34, §§ 7.1-7.2.
121. Marshall, Guinness Affair Rocks Britain's Financial Club, L.A. Times,
Feb. 2, 1987, pt. iv, at 1; Rules for the City, THE ECONoMIsT, Feb. 7, 1987, at 17.
122. This includes the removal of Stock Exchange Rules blocking entrance of
banks in the business of issuing securities in the United Kingdom and the removal of
the restrictions on activities of building societies.
123. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60.
124. Galpin, supra note 82, § 4.2. The ISRO, for example, made it clear that
there was a strong desire for regulatory economy among its members. Agnew, supra
note 68, § 6.1.
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4. FINANCIAL REGULATION ALONG FUNCTIONAL LINES UNDER
THE NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
4.1. Overlaps within the Regulatory Framework for Investment
Business
One way a single firm could avoid problems of multiple authoriza-
tion and regulation is to obtain direct authorization from the SIB. This
alternative is viable since the SIB has a complete rule book to regulate
the activities of the firm while the firm is active on the exchanges.' 25
Although Professor Gower seemed to suggest direct authorization as an
alternative only in cases where a certain market segment was without
an SRO when the new framework came into force, it is clear from the
DTI White Paper and subsequent statements by Government officials
that direct authorization is a complete alternative to multiple member-
ship in SROs.'28 The SIB, however, does not want to be involved with
much day-to-day regulation and has not encouraged firms to apply for
direct authorization, but it expects that some foreign firms will do so. "7
Authorization through membership in SROs, on the other hand,
may have the inherent danger of encouraging SRO-shopping. It seems
unlikely that this will be possible given the fact that the capital require-
ments of the SROs will have to be identical and not just equivalent 28
to those of the SIB. In addition, the SIB only intends to recognize one
SRO per market segment thereby eliminating competition among SROs
for membership. As a result, a firm will only have a choice between
membership in the SRO competent for the particular market seg-
ment 2 9 or direct authorization by the SIB.
The key to the soundness of the whole system seems to lie with the
SIB and the way in which it will use the recognition powers it has
under the Financial Services Act. The SIB's Regulation of Investment
Business Rules do not contain any explicit indication as to how these
powers will be used. An indication can be found, however, in the addi-
tional statement submitted to the Secretary of State as a supplement to
125. The Financial Services Act distinguishes from recognized investment ex-
changes. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, §§ 8(1), 36(1).
126. Howard, Keynote Address, in THE CITY AFTER THE FINANCIAL SERVICES
ACT: A FINANCIAL TIMES CONFERENCE § 2.2 (1986).
127. ADDITIONAL STATEMENT, supra note 73, at 8. Nevertheless some 108
firms seem to have taken this course of action. Morrisey, FSA Getting Your Act To-
gether by A-day, 9 INT'L FIN. L. REV., May 1988, at 7.
128. Berrill, Keynote Address, in THE CITY AFTER THE FINANCIAL SERVICES
ACT: A FINANCIAL TIMES CONFERENCE § 3.2 (1986).
129. However, the firm possibly may choose an SRO competent for another
market segment, but this will depend on the boundaries of the scope rules that the SIB
intends to impose.
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these draft rules and regulations when they were published at the be-
ginning of February 1987. The SIB proposed to enter into a Memoran-
dum of Understanding on mutual cooperation and exchange of infor-
mation with the SROs and other bodies it recognizes.130 In the process
of recognizing SROs, the SIB intended to have detailed discussions with
prospective SROs on the question of sharing information with the SIB
and other supervisory authorities, and an SRO would be required to
confirm its willingness to cooperate with the SIB and other relevant
regulators in order to obtain recognition.'
In its pamphlet entitled "Regulation of Investment Business: The
New Framework," the SIB suggested the concept of a lead-regulator as
a possible solution for the overlaps of regulatory powers within the sys-
tem of the Financial Services Act as such.' 32 In addition, the SIB pro-
130. ADDITIONAL STATEMENT, supra note 73, at 25.
131. Id. at 39.
132. The SIB explained:
The lead regulator will generally be the SRO responsible for the largest
part of a firm's business. Other SROs will be able to provide for financial
monitoring of the firm to be done by the SRO which is the lead regulator:
for each multiple-authorized firm there will need to be a clear understand-
ing as to which SRO this will be, and the Board will wish to be informed
of all such arrangements. Where the firm is authorized by the Board for
any significant amount of business, the Board will normally itself assume
the role of lead regulator. Close cooperation between SROs will be an
essential part of the system and an SRO's willingness to share information
with others will be a requirement of recognition.
The lead regulator will receive and assess all information relevant
to the capital adequacy of the firm and set requirements for the firm as a
whole. It will notify other SROs in the event of any problem and will
coordinate remedial action should this be necessary. Other SROs will be
expected to use their powers, in cooperation with the lead regulator, to
limit a firm's business, in the event of its becoming over-extended.
The lead regulator would have no role in setting or monitoring
compliance with conduct of business rules in areas that are not within the
scope for which it has authorized the firm. But disciplinary cases started
by any SRO should be notified to the lead regulator as they may affect
confidence in a financial sense and may in some cases cast doubt on com-
petence and probity generally. Nothing in the lead regulator approach is
intended to lessen the ability of any SRO to form an independent judg-
ment as to the 'fitness and properness' of the firm outside the area of
capital adequacy.
It is possible that the lead regulator concept could usefully be adapted
to groups of companies which may be individually authorized by different
SROs and subject to their individual capital and monitoring requirements.
The Board will wish to ensure that capital, assessed on a group basis,
takes full account of the relationships between individual members of the
group and their own individual positions, and will seek to ensure that the
monitoring of capital is done by a single lead regulator in cooperation with
all of the interested SROs. Again, if the Board were involved in any sig-
nificant part of the group it would normally expect to perform this func-
tion. The group lead regulator would coordinate the exercise of powers by
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posed two types of arrangements between regulators:
(1) Arrangements for the consultation and sharing of informa-
tion between regulators with a regulatory interest in the same group or
firm. These will be put in place in order to ensure an adequate and
effective liaison between regulators in monitoring a supervised group or
firm and will relate principally to matters of financial supervision.
However, information concerning business conduct and other matters
will also be shared where appropriate. The goal is to ensure that all of
the regulators oversee the group, while as an individual regulator each
is responsible only for the day-to-day supervision of part of the
group.133 The designated lead-regulator will call meetings for the shar-
ing of information on a regular basis (probably annually) as well as on
an ad hoc basis. 3
(2) Arrangements for the delegation of financial monitoring by
an SRO or SIB. The Act permits an SRO or the SIB to make arrange-
ments whereby the task of day-to-day monitoring can be delegated by
one regulator to another. Such delegation can happen whenever the rec-
ognizing body is satisfied that the arrangements made by the monitor-
ing body are adequate." 5
These arrangements are designed to avoid imposing unnecessary
duplication or conflict of financial reporting requirements upon the su-
pervised firm and to avoid the overlap of supervisory efforts by regula-
tors. The SIB intends to encourage these arrangements but recognizes
that they remain voluntary since they are entirely at the option and
judgment of the individual regulators."3
4.2. Overlaps Among Regulators of Different Functions
4.2. 1. Listed Money Market Institutions
The SIB will have to share its regulatory powers with the Bank of
England in at least two segments of the investment business market.
Listed money market institutions are exempt from the need to obtain
authorization under the Financial Services Act. To ensure that there
the individual SROs with respect to companies within the group and the
capital dedicated to the various firms' activities.
THE NEW FRAMEWORK, supra note 99, §§ 1.19-1.22 (emphasis added).
133. ADDITIONAL STATEMENT, supra note 73, at 25.
134. Id. at 26.
135. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, sched. 2, § 4(2) (dealing with SROs);
id., sched. 3, § 4(4) (dealing with recognition of professional bodies); id., sched. 4, §
3(2) (dealing with recognition of investment exchanges); id., sched. 7, § 3(2) (dealing
with the SIB) (Schedule 7 expressly provides that only monitoring and not enforcement
can be delegated, but the same conclusion can be implied from the other schedules).
136. ADDITIONAL STATEMENT, supra note 73, at 26.
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are no material gaps in the regulatory framework which might weaken
the degree of protection afforded to investors, exemption from the ambit
of the Financial Services Act will be granted only if institutions carry
out the transactions appearing on a list created by the Bank of Eng-
land. Work was progressing at the end of 1986 on a consultative docu-
ment setting out detailed proposals for the Bank regulation of these
markets and the qualifying conditions for appearing on the list.137
These proposals include "conduct of business rules",13 "fit and proper
criteria,"13' 9 and requirements for capital adequacy.
The wholesale market in sterling, foreign exchange and bullion,
which the Bank will supervise under the new arrangements, are de-
fined in terms of instruments traded, the institutions trading and the
size of the transactions usually involved. 4 ' With regard to capital ade-
quacy criteria, the Bank proposed to make two sorts of distinctions: (1)
an institutional distinction in which each would apply its own indepen-
dent test as wholesale-market supervisor to some listed institutions but
not to others already supervised by certain other regulatory authorities;
and (2) a functional distinction between firms acting as principal clear-
ers and those acting purely as brokers. 1 ' Where the Bank itself set the
capital test under the Banking Act 1979, it would take those into ac-
count and apply no other tests. However, where the tests are set by
another supervisor,' 42 the Bank announced it would discuss with that
other supervisor how best to reduce unnecessary supervisory overlap.
The Bank would investigate on a case-by-case basis whether the moni-
toring of capital adequacy should be delegated to the other supervisory
authority with the Bank retaining the authority to assure adequate cap-
italization of the listed institutions. In the cases where the Bank would
not be directly assessing capital adequacy itself, it would seek to ensure
that the standards applied were commensurate with those which it ap-
plied in wholesale-market trading.' 43
The problem of clearly dividing the responsibilities between the
137. The Bank of England published a draft framework in December 1986.
BANK OF ENGLAND, THE FUTURE REGULATION OF THE WHOLESALE MARKETS IN
STERLING, FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND BULLTON (1986) [hereinafter THE FUTURE
REGULATION]; see Ingram, supra note 40, at 63.
138. For example, the institutions would have to agree to observe the Code of
Conduct of Wholesale Markets that was in force under the Bank of England's prior
prudential regulatory authority. The intention is not to change the fundamental princi-
ples involved but to ensure that they are universally known and observed.
139. THE FUTURE REGULATION, supra note 137, at 4.
140. Id. at 2.
141. Id. at 5.
142. For example, the document refers to the Building Societies Commission in
the case of building societies. Id.
143. Id. at 6.
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Bank and other supervisors of wholesale instruments remains. The
Bank's responsibilities in this area should help eliminate the overlaps
which would have occurred had regulation of the wholesale markets
fallen exclusively to the Financial Services Supervisors. 44
4.2.2. The Gilt-Edged Market
The Bank of England has also retained its power over the gilt-
edged market. 45 In order to ensure that the entire gilt-edged market is
subject to Stock Exchange regulations as far as trading practices and
professional standards are concerned, the market makers, Stock Ex-
change money brokers, 46 and inter-broker-dealers' 4 7 will be required
to be members of the Stock Exchange. The Bank requires the market
makers to have dedicated sterling assets in the United Kingdom and
maintains close supervision of the adequacy of their capital in relation
to the exposure to various risks. In addition, the Bank monitors the
performance of the market makers functional obligations.'48 To supple-
ment this prudential supervision, the Bank has required all gilt-edged
market making entities to be members of the Stock Exchange. As a
result, the Stock Exchange Compensation Fund will be available to
144. Galpin, supra note 82, § 4.4.
145. However, the gilt-edged market is not exempt from regulation under the
Financial Services Act. See Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, sched. 1, §§ 3, 4 (deal-
ing with government securities). With regard to the restructuring of the gilt-edged mar-
ket, the Bank of England's original proposals were published in November 1984 and
reprinted in 24 BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 513 (1984). An updated version was published in
April 1985. BANK OF ENGLAND, THE FUTURE STRUCTURE OF THE GILT EDGED
MARKET: THE BANK OF ENGLAND'S DEALING RELATIONSHIP WITH CERTAIN PAR-
TICIPANTS (1985), reprinted in The Future Structure of the Gilt Edged Market, 25
BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 250 (1985) [hereinafter The Future Structure of the Gilt Edged
Market]; see I. KERR, supra note 38, at 92.
146. "The main function of [Stock Exchange] money brokers [is] to act as in-
termediaries in stock borrowing and lending, to lend funds to market makers running
net long positions in stock and to take funds from market makers running net short
positions in stock." The Future Structure of the Gilt Edged Market, supra note 145, at
274.
147.
[Inter-broker dealers will] operate between market makers, taking bids
and offers for stock from market makers and disseminating them among
the other market makers, [thereby making it] easier for market makers to
unwind stock positions that arise from their market making activities with
investors or their agents. . .[Inter-broker dealers] will consequently con-
tribute to the overall liquidity of the market.
Id. at 280.
148. In return for their dealing relationship with the Bank of England, the mar-
ket making firms have undertaken "an obligation to make, on demand and in any
trading conditions, continuous and effective two-way prices." Jackson, supra note 14,
at 547; see The Future Structure of the Gilt Edged Market: Official Operations, 26
BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 569 (1986).
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compensate the outside customers of member firms and subject the enti-
ties to Stock Exchange regulation with regard to questions of fairness,
conflict of interest and professional competence. 49
4.2.3. The Insurance Industry
Under the Financial Services Act, the SIB's Conduct of Business
Rules will apply to insurance companies and friendly societies only
with respect to "marketing" policies and the management and market-
ing of pension funds. The financial resources rules will not apply since
the remaining areas will be covered by the other regulatory systems.' 50
4.2.4. Regulatory Responses to These Overlaps
With regard to the blurring of distinctions between functions in the
financial services industry, the SIB's Regulation of Investment Busi-
ness: The New Framework stated:
The Board is considering together with other financial regu-
lators, the extent to which the lead regulator concept may
have application outside the system of investment business
authorization. In particular it will be concerned to minimize
duplication in reporting requirements on banks which are
authorized as deposit-takers by the Bank of England but
may also require authorization in respect of their investment
business by the Board or by an SRO. More generally there
will be a need for close coordination between all regulatory
authorities with regard to conglomerates with interests in a
range of financial activities. The Board will expect to use its
powers to share information within a network of financial
regulators both in this country and overseas."'
The Governor of the Bank of England has made it clear that although
none of the supervisors could give up responsibility over his own area,
they must all give regard to the activities going on elsewhere in the
same firm or group of firms. He supported the idea of agreeing on
procedures permitting cooperation and the exchange of information be-
tween various supervisors while the Bill was still pending.1
5 2
Relations have been established between the main supervisors and
regulators to work out this concept of sharing supervisory responsibil-
149. George, supra note 2, at 425.
150. EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 83, § 8.
151. THE NEW FRAMEWORK, supra note 99, § 1.23.
152. Governor of the Bank of England, supra note 20, at 72.
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ity. From the point of view of the Bank of England, the financial ser-
vices regulators (i.e., the SIB and SROs) will probably take the lead in
developing standards for the conduct of business, while the Bank will
assume the monitoring role for banks subject to multiple authorization.
Both would agree on a common set of prudential standards especially
for capital cover and facilitating the delegation of monitoring. The
Bank also intends to discuss the coverage, the procedures and the form
of liaison between the supervisors with the supervisors and the institu-
tion involved whenever the monitoring has been delegated to the Bank.
The Bank further indicated that a distinction will be made be-
tween supervision over a single institution subject to multiple authori-
zation and the regulation of a financial conglomerate. In the case of a
financial conglomerate, the lead regulator will act as the chairman of a
college of all the supervisors with an interest in the group, and his role
will be to promote the exchange of information between supervisors
and to ensure that there is a proper coordination of their activities. Re-
sponsibility for taking action will remain with each supervisor within
his own area of statutory responsibility."' 3
The Financial Services Act has greatly promoted this exchange of
information by enabling financial services supervisors to disclose infor-
mation to other supervisors and by removing the constraints on the dis-
closure of information to other supervisors in the Banking, Companies
and Insurance Companies Acts. 54
During 1987, talks continued between the SIB and the Bank of
England in an effort to reach an agreement on the application of the
lead regulator concept to banks. An agreement seems to have been
reached whereby the Bank will monitor financial resources and overall
soundness if a bank keeps its securities business on its own balance
sheet. If, on the other hand, it uses a separate subsidiary for that busi-
ness, the SIB or an SRO will do the monitoring of the subsidiary and
its business, while the Bank will continue to monitor the bank qua
bank. 155
As lead regulator, the Bank would
send a quarterly report to the SIB or the SRO certifying that
the bank is complying with the required capital ratios and
153. Galpin, supra note 82, § 4.3.
154. While the disclosure of information is restricted, there is an exception "for
the purpose of enabling or assisting a recognized self-regulating organisation,
recognised investment exchange, recognised professional body, or recognised clearing
house to discharge its functions as such." Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, §§ 179-
80.
155. The City of Europe in Learning to Manage - A Survey of the City of
London, THE ECONOMIST, June 25, 1988, at 31.
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giving details of its activities in the securities markets. If a
problem arises, even in the securities side, the Bank will deal
with it, and the SIB can intervene only at the Bank's
invitation.'5 6
Unfortunately, no official text of such an agreement has been pub-
lished. The SIB and the Bank of England have continued discussing
the related problems and seem to distinguish between three types of
overlaps: (1) the bank has acquired securities; (2) the bank engages in
securities trading on a full-fledged basis; and (3) the bank engages in
securities trading on a de minimis basis. Both parties hope to finalize
their agreement in the near future, and the agreement will probably
become public when officially communicated by the Bank of England
to the British Banker's Association. In regard to the institutions that
are exempt from regulation under the Financial Services Act, Memo-
randa of Understanding probably have been entered into with the dif-
ferent institutions.
5. CONCLUSION: A MODEL FOR FUTURE U.S. RE-REGULATION?
It would be wrong to describe the changes that took place in the
United Kingdom as deregulation; rather, this is a perfect example of
re-regulation. Although initiated primarily in reaction to the problems
caused by a failing system of investor protection, the emerging regula-
tory structure has tried to take into account the market realities: finan-
cial conglomerates active in different market segments. The statutory
backed self-regulatory system is organized along functional lines, and
everything has been done to encourage the regulators to coordinate and
cooperate in the exercise of their functions and powers. Both conclu-
sions are important for the current debate in the United States.
From the 1930s and into the 1970s, Congress established a regula-
tory system for the U.S. financial services industry based along industry
lines: "[b]anks were regulated by banking agencies, broker-dealers by
state and federal securities agencies, and federal savings and loan as-
sociations and federal savings banks by thrift agencies.' 5  The legisla-
tive history suggests that Congress wanted to have a market "in which
banks, broker-dealers, thrifts and insurance companies would not com-
pete outside their industry."' 5 8 Since the 1930s, however, firms from
156. Financial Regulation: SIB and Bank Agree on Supervision of Banks
Under FSA, 2 J. INT'L BANKING L. N-110 (1987)
157. Peters & Powers, supra note 5, at 1077; see Friedman & Friesen, supra
note 2, at 416-27.
158. Peters & Powers, supra note 5, at 1080.
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different industries within the financial world have competed increas-
ingly across industry border lines, a phenomenon which has accelerated
in the last ten years. This cross-industry competition threatens the in-
tegrity of the institutionally based regulatory structure.
Although several proposals were made in response to this prob-
lem, 59 most of these proposals attempted to find a new congruence be-
tween financial institutions and existing regulators. The Reagan Ad-
ministration proposal only included the suggestions of the Bush Task
Force Report, 6 ' which were limited to a streamlining of the regulatory
powers of federal banking regulators, and it did not address the related
issue of whether financial institutions should be allowed to enter the
other segments of the financial services industry. 6'
The debate on how to re-regulate the U.S. financial markets in-
tensified when the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, E. Gerald Corrigan, gave a speech before the New York State
Banker's Association. Corrigan argued in favor of eliminating many of
the distinctions between banks, securities firms and insurance compa-
nies, while at the same time explicitly addressing some of the issues this
would raise at the regulatory level.'62
Rather than favoring a wholesale deregulation including the sys-
tematic relaxation or elimination of the separation of banking and com-
merce, Corrigan argued for moving in the direction of a more uniform
and integrated approach to the operation and supervision of the bank-
ing and financial system, while still preserving the distinction between
"banking" and the remainder of the economy. According to Corrigan,
"the blending of banking and commerce raise[d], a host of potential
problems ranging from its consequences for the impartiality of the
credit decision making process to the operation and reach of the super-
visory system and the public safety net more generally."' 63 As an alter-
native, however, Corrigan was willing to accept the blurring between
classes of financial institutions and financial functions while seeking to
preserve the distinction between banking-finance and commerce. 64 As
a result of the proposed framework, the existing legal barriers prevent-
159. For a discussion of these proposals, see Friedman & Friesen, supra note 2,
at 442-45.
160. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
161. Functional Regulation, Other Provisions in Administration's Competitive-
ness Bill, supra note 5, at 343.
162. See Quint, Sweeping Changes in Financial System Urged, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 30, 1987, at 1, col. 4; Kutler, NY Fed Chief Proposes Major Overhaul in Struc-
ture of Financial Services Industry, Am. Banker, Jan. 30, 1987, at 1, col. 2.
163. Corrigan, Financial Market Structure: A Longer View 25 (1987) (essay by
the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
164. Id. at 26.
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ing various classes of financial institutions from engaging in certain
types of financial activities would be largely eliminated, and the struc-
ture would be similar to the post-Big Bang environment in the United
Kingdom.-0 5
At the regulatory level, the various supervisory and regulatory re-
quirements would have to be met. Firms that would gain access to the
payment system and to the discount window would become subject to a
degree of consolidated supervision by the Federal Reserve and would be
subject to interest earning liquidity reserves. However, consideration of
the important changes that would have to take place in the supervisory
apparatus remained limited to a discussion of certain interim changes.
According to Corrigan, it would not be necessary or desirable to imme-
diately restructure the entire federal and state regulatory apparatus in
light of the fact that the market system itself had to go through a period
of transition and evolution. Rather, experience should first be gained
with the financial structure as it would develop.166
Although Corrigan proposed the establishment of a "Financial
Services Oversights Board" in order to insure that his definition of "fi-
nancial services" would be uniformly applied to maintain a meaningful
distinction between "banking-finance" and "commerce," he did not fur-
ther address the issue of cooperation between the federal and state reg-
ulators. This issue necessarily follows from his acceptance of affiliations
among banks, thrift companies, insurance companies, securities compa-
nies and other wholly financial firms in conjunction with the mainte-
nance of the existing regulatory structure which exercises its regulatory
tasks on a functional basis.
Other proposals have similarly addressed the issue of redesigning
financial regulation in the United States. These proposals focus espe-
cially on what an enterprise with a bank in its corporate structure
could do elsewhere in the financial services industry via non-bank affil-
iates or subsidiaries and on how such an enterprise should be regulated.
Like the Corrigan proposal, they opt for a system of functional regula-
tion exercised through the existing regulators. The debate is concerned
with whether the entity owning a bank should be subject to consoli-
dated official supervision and whether banks should be permitted to
affiliate themselves with non-financial as well as financial
enterprises.167
A process of changing the existing institutionally based regulatory
165. Id. at 42.
166. Id. at 43.
167. Huertas, supra note 1, at 16-17; for a critical discussion of the assumptions
underlying these proposals for regulatory reform, see Parry, supra note 3.
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system into a system of functional regulation should provide for the
necessary means of cooperation among the various regulators. The issue
of cooperation does not seem to have been addressed by the proposals
for regulatory reform yet. The United Kingdom's Financial Services
Act can be used as an example in this regard: provisions have been
inserted allowing the exchange of information and delegation of certain
monitoring tasks among the regulators. Contrary to the U.S. experi-
ence, however, the British financial services industry has traditionally
been characterized by a process of informal contacts between regulators
and between the regulators and the regulated firms. In turn, these con-
tacts facilitated the needed cooperation. It is an open question whether
this willingness to cooperate - the basis for the success of a re-regula-
tion along the U.K. model - is present in the U.S. financial services
industry.
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